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COMMENTS
A LAW OF PASSION, NOT OF PRINCIPLE,
NOR EVEN PURPOSE: A CALL TO REPEAL
OR REVISE THE ADAM WALSH ACT
AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM
ACT OF 1984
Michael R. Handler *
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 lays out the rules and procedures for
federal pretrial release and detention. In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act, Congress amended the Bail Reform Act.
Before the Adam Walsh Act Amendments (AWA Amendments) were passed,
a judicial officer decided whether to release a defendant, whether to impose
pretrial release conditions, and what pretrial release conditions to impose
on a case-by-case basis. The AWA Amendments, in contrast, impose
mandatory pretrial release conditions, including electronic monitoring and
curfew, on all defendants charged with certain enumerated sexual offenses
against children. Many district courts have found mandatory imposition of
pretrial release conditions unconstitutional and refuse to apply the AWA
Amendments when setting bail.
This Comment argues that Congress must repeal or revise the AWA
Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 because they are
unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses, are
completely inconsistent with the Bail Reform Act’s core principle of
individualized judicial determination of bail, and come at a great cost to the
defendant at little or no additional benefit to the public. This Comment
proposes that the AWA Amendments be revised so that certain pretrial
release conditions are imposed based on a rebuttable presumption instead
*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011; B.A.,
M.A., Emory University, 2006.
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of mandatorily, as in, a judge will impose them unless a defendant can
rebut their imposition with evidence that the conditions are unnecessary to
ensure the public’s safety. This proposed revision not only fulfills
Congress’s original purpose of increased safety in enacting the AWA
Amendments, but it is also constitutional and consistent with the rest of the
Bail Reform Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2006, George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA). 1 Standing next to him was John
Walsh, the father of the AWA’s namesake. 2 Exactly twenty-five years
earlier, Adam Walsh, who was six years old at the time, was abducted and
murdered. 3 However, John Walsh did not receive the privilege of standing
next to President Bush as he signed the AWA because his son was a victim
of the type of crime against children the AWA was intended to protect.
Instead, John Walsh was likely given the honor because he was also the
host of America’s Most Wanted, a long-running show on the FOX network
devoted exclusively to apprehending extremely dangerous fugitives. In
addition to helping catch the criminals that America’s Most Wanted features
on the show, Mr. Walsh and his program have been lauded for their role in
helping bring the threat of crime, especially sexual offenses against
children, to the forefront of the public’s mind. 4
John Walsh and his television program were instrumental to the
passage of the AWA. 5 The success of America’s Most Wanted and other
shows inspired by its success, including NBC’s To Catch a Predator and
CNN’s Nancy Grace, have helped create a public panic about the threat of

1
Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1395 (July 27, 2006) (enacting Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)).
2
Id.
3
Yolanne Almanzar, 27 Years Later, Case is Closed in Slaying of Abducted Child, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A18.
4
See Barbara Whitaker, ‘America’s Most Wanted’ Enlists Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at A20 (describing the positive impact America’s Most Wanted has had on capturing
violent criminals and recovering abducted children).
5
See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 457–58 (2010) (“The mass media has fanned the flames by using . . .
war rhetoric in discussing the crackdown on sex offenders. Early in the second Bush
administration, CNN featured a rape counselor who called for an aggressive war on sex
offenders. In 2006, John Walsh, Adam Walsh’s father said that his show, America’s Most
Wanted, was starting a ‘war’ on sex offenders, Fox News personalities Sean Hannity, Alan
Colmes, and Bill O’Reilly offered their support with such a mission.”).
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child sex offenders. 6 This panic has created a demand for Congress to enact
laws that in many other contexts would be considered draconian. 7 Philip
Jenkins explains how, during a panic, “concern over sexual abuse provides
a basis for extravagant claims-making by professionals, the media, and
assorted interest groups, who argue that the problem is quantitatively and
qualitatively far more severe than anyone could reasonably suppose.”8 Fear
mongering, in turn, produces excessive and ill-considered legislative
responses, with lawmakers adopting new policies that “may cause harm in
areas having nothing to do with the original problem and that divert
resources away from measures which might genuinely assist in protecting
children.” 9
Much of the AWA—including the AWA Amendments to the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 (BRA)—is exactly the excessive and ill-considered
legislative response that Mr. Jenkins warns is characteristic of Congress
making laws in response to a panic. In enacting the AWA, the federal
government for the first time sought a prominent role in sex offender
policy, substantially expanding prior federal efforts to regulate and punish
sex offenses. 10 The AWA was formed from a conglomeration of bills that
were before Congress at the time and includes many different laws.
Scholars and appellate courts have vociferously debated the constitutional
and practical merits of many of the AWA’s laws. Such laws include the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires
that a sex offender register in any jurisdiction where he or she resides,
works, or is a student, 11 and the Jimmy Ryce Civil Commitment Program,
which authorizes the federal government to civilly commit, in a federal

6

Id.
See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The
bottom line here is that sex offenders have run rampant in this country and now Congress
and the people are ready to respond with legislation that will curtail the ability of sex
offenders to operate freely. It is our hope that programs like NBC Dateline’s ‘To Catch a
Predator’ series will no longer have enough material to fill an hour or even a minute. Now,
it seems, they can go to any city in this country and catch dozens of predators willing to go
on-line to hunt children.”).
8
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1998).
9
Id.
10
Yung, supra note 5, at 451. The first significant federal sex offender restriction
legislation was The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–
42 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (requiring states to implement a sex
offender and crimes against children registry).
11
42 U.S.C. § 16919 (2006).
7
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facility, any “sexually dangerous” person “in the custody” of the Bureau of
Prisons—even after that person has completed his prison sentence.12
Commentary on the AWA Amendments to the BRA, however, is
conspicuously missing from the literature on the AWA laws, even though
the Amendments also raise significant constitutional and practical concerns.
Before the AWA Amendments were passed, a judicial officer exclusively
decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether to release a defendant, whether to
impose pretrial release conditions, and what pretrial release conditions to
impose. 13 The AWA Amendments, in contrast, impose mandatory pretrial
release conditions, including electronic monitoring and curfew, on all
defendants charged with certain enumerated sexual offenses against
children. 14
This Comment argues that Congress must repeal the AWA
Amendments or, in the alternative, revise them so defendants can avoid the
imposition of these now mandatory release conditions with rebuttal
evidence that the conditions are not necessary to ensure the public’s safety.
First, the AWA Amendments must be repealed or revised because they are
unconstitutional on their face as a violation of the Excessive Bail and Due
Process Clauses. Second, the Amendments’ imposition of mandatory
pretrial release conditions is inconsistent with one of the core principles of
federal pretrial release under the BRA—judicially determined
individualized bail. Lastly, the Amendments do considerably more harm
than good because costly pretrial release conditions are imposed
automatically even when they are unnecessary to ensure the public’s safety.
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part II provides an overview of
federal pretrial release and detention under the BRA, the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Salerno upholding the BRA’s constitutionality,
and the AWA Amendments to the BRA. Part III describes how the federal
judiciary has reacted to the AWA Amendments. Part IV argues that the
AWA Amendments must be repealed or revised. Part V proposes a revision
to the Amendments that fulfills Congress’s original purpose in enacting the
Amendment while fixing the problems described in Part IV. Part VI
concludes.

12

18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2006). In United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010),
the Supreme Court held that § 4248, the federal statute allowing a district court to order the
civil commitment of a sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner
would otherwise be released, was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.
at 1967–68.
13
See infra Part II.A.
14
See infra Part II.C.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984

The history of federal bail legislation begins with the Judiciary Act of
1789, in which Congress mandated that bail be granted to all defendants
accused of noncapital crimes. 15 Yet, the use of bail was so inconsistent in
the mid-twentieth century that Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
1966. 16 One commentator notes that “[b]efore 1966, federal courts relied
on bail ‘almost exclusively’ to ensure a defendant’s presence at trial.” 17
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 required the federal courts to release any
defendant charged with a non-capital crime on his or her recognizance or an
unsecured appearance bond unless the court determined that the defendant
would fail to appear for trial under such minimal supervision. 18
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, when initially passed “effected a dramatic overhaul of
the nature and function of federal pretrial release proceedings.” 19 Section
3142 changed prior law dramatically by including “the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be
posed by the person’s release” as a factor a judicial officer must consider in
determining conditions of pretrial release. 20 The change in the law reflected
“the deep public concern . . . about the growing problem of crimes
committed by persons on release.” 21
The BRA requires a hearing to determine whether any condition or
combination of conditions of release would protect the safety of the
community and reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance. 22 The BRA
also places the burden on the government to establish the defendant’s

15
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3141 (2006)).
16
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 4, 80 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146–3152 (Supp V. 1966))..
17
Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s
Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005).
18
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
DETENTION, 1966, at 5 (1999) (citing H.R. REP NO. 1541-89 (1966)).
19
John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness: Preventative
Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV. 639, 648 (1989); see also United
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403–06 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing how § 3142 of the
BRA has dramatically changed prior law).
20
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006).
21
S. REP. NO. 225-98, at 6–7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188–89.
22
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
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dangerousness by “clear and convincing evidence.” 23 In a bail hearing, the
BRA aides the government by including a rebuttable presumption in favor
of detention based on risk of flight and protecting public safety in two
categories of cases: (1) where the defendant has, while on pretrial release in
the preceding five years, committed and been convicted of one of the
offenses for which a detention hearing may be held; or (2) where the
defendant is charged with a major drug offense or certain firearm
offenses. 24 Thus, while Congress left “[t]he pretrial fate of other defendants
subject to a hearing who pose a specific and unrestrainable danger before
trial . . . entirely to courts to be determined on a case-by-case basis,” the
establishment of presumptions of dangerousness and flight in the BRA gave
Congress some control over the pretrial process that otherwise would be left
to the courts. 25
Aside from the BRA’s “presumption of dangerousness” provision,
“Congress hesitated to go very far in specifying what characteristics should
receive the most weight in the determination of dangerousness.” 26 Instead,
Congress put in place extensive procedural mechanisms in an effort to
increase the accuracy of judicial determinations of future dangerousness. 27
At a bail hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel, the right to testify,
the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in support of or
against future dangerousness, and the right to present information by
proffer. 28 The judicial officer must take into account certain statutory
factors and find by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of
release are adequate to ensure public safety, giving written findings of fact
and reasons for his determination. This decision is also subject to
immediate review. 29

23

Id.
§ 3142(e).
25
Howard, supra note 19, at 652.
26
Id.
27
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“Under the Bail Reform Act,
the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness
are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination.”).
28
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
29
Id. §§ 3142(f), (i), § 3145. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a
written statement of reasons accompany a release order. FED. R. APP. P. 9(a), In several
circuits, a failure to comply with this requirement in contested cases results in a remand.
DAVID N. ADAIR, THE BAIL REFORM ACT 4 (3d ed. 2006) (citing to United States v. Cantu,
935 F.2d 950, 951 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir.
1990); United States v. Hooks, 811 F.2d 391, 391 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States
v. Wheeler, 795 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467,
1480 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Coleman, 777 F.2d 888, 892 (3d Cir. 1985)).
24
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If the judicial officer finds that detention is not necessary to ensure
public safety, the judicial officer may release the defendant on personal
recognizance or unsecured appearance bond. 30 If such release “will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger
the safety of any other person or the community,” 31 the judicial officer must
impose “the least restrictive . . . condition, or combination of conditions,
that . . . will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.” 32
B. UNITED STATES V. SALERNO AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
BRA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION PROVISION

In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court held that the Bail
Reform Act’s pretrial detention provision was constitutional.33 Although
the AWA Amendments to the BRA concern situations where a defendant is
released on bail pursuant to § 3142(b), Salerno’s rejection of due process
and excessive bail challenges to the BRA’s detention provision informs the
constitutional analysis of the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial
conditions. 34
First, the Court rejected the argument that the BRA’s authorization of
pretrial detention constitutes impermissible punishment before trial, and
thus violates substantive due process. 35 The Court explained, “the mere fact
that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
government has imposed punishment.” 36 The Court further explained that
“[u]nless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the
punitive/regulatory distinction turns on ‘whether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it].’” 37
The Court concluded that the BRA’s legislative history “clearly
indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions
30

18 U.S.C. § 3142(a).
§ 3142(c).
32
§ 3142(c)(1)(B).
33
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
34
This Comment argues that the AWA Amendments violate procedural due process. See
infra Part IV.A.2. Although the defendants in Salerno challenged the BRA on a substantive
due process basis, the Supreme Court held that the BRA is facially valid under the Due
Process Clause in part because of the “procedural protections it offers.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at
752.
35
Id. at 746–47.
36
Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
37
Id. at 747 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
31
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as punishment for dangerous individuals,” but “instead perceived pretrial
detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem”—the
legitimate regulatory goal of “preventing danger to the community.” 38 The
Court also found that pretrial detention was not excessive in relation to the
regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve because the BRA narrowly
focuses on a particularly acute problem—crime by arrestees—in which the
government’s interests are overwhelming. 39 Further, the BRA satisfied due
process scrutiny because the detention provision “operates only on
individuals who have been arrested for particular extremely serious
offenses,” and carefully delineates the circumstances under which detention
will be permitted.40
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the BRA was a
“scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these
serious crimes” 41 because it guarantees defendants extensive procedural
safeguards, including a full-blown adversary hearing where the government
is required to convince a neutral decision-maker by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of
the community or any person. 42 In sum, the Court upheld the BRA because
of its legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose and the procedural
protections it offers.43
C. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT

In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, Congress enacted “improvements to the bail reform act to address sex
crimes and other matters.” 44 The AWA Amendments mandate that in any
case involving a minor victim under certain sections of Title 18’s Crime
and Criminal Procedure 45 or a failure to register offense under § 2250, “any
38

Id.
Id. at 750. The Court in Salerno explained that these were the individuals “Congress
specifically found . . . are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the
community after arrest.” Id.
40
Id. at 749.
41
Id. at 750.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 749–50.
44
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 203, 120 Stat. 587, 613 (2006).
45
The sections mandating mandatory pretrial release conditions pursuant to the
Amendment include: §§ 1201 [kidnapping], 1591 [sex trafficking of children or by force,
fraud, or coercion], 2241 [aggravated sexual abuse], 2242 [sexual abuse], 2244(a)(1)
[abusive sexual contact], 2245 [offenses resulting in death], 2251 [sexual exploitation of
children], 2251A [selling or buying of children for sexual exploitation], 2252(a)(1),
2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1) [transmission of child pornography], 2252A(a)(2)
[receipt of child pornography], 2252A(a)(3) [reproduction of child pornography],
39
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release order shall contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic
monitoring and each of the conditions specified . . . .” 46 Therefore, under
the Amendments an individual charged with one of the above crimes—
which are all sex-offender oriented—must:
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel;
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness
who may testify concerning the offense;
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial services
agency, or other agency;
(vii) comply with a specified curfew; [and]
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
47
weapon.

Unlike the evidence and legislative findings Congress produced in
support of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the legislative record of the AWA
Amendments suggests that Congress neither engaged in substantive debate
nor developed supporting congressional reports in enacting the law. The
AWA Amendments were added to the bill’s language only seven days prior
to the bill’s final passage as part of a Senate floor amendment 48 without any
debate. 49 In addition to being absent from the legislative history, the AWA
Amendments are also nowhere to be found in President George W. Bush’s
signing statement, 50 further suggesting that it was not perceived as a major
part of the law when it was enacted. 51 As discussed in Part IV, the AWA

2252A(a)(4) [sale or possession of child pornography], 2260 [production of child
pornography for importation into the United States], 2421 [transportation of individual for
illegal sexual activity], 2422 [coercion or enticement of individual to travel interstate or
foreign territory to engage in prostitution], 2423 [transportation of minor to engage in
criminal sexual activity], and 2425 [communication of minor under sixteen for purposes of
sexual activity].
46
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006).
47
Id.
48
See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (reproducing debate following
passage of Sen. Hatch’s amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the mandatory
conditions).
49
In contrast to the AWA Amendments, the other major legislative provisions of the
Adam Walsh Act were passed after congressional debate. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-218,
at 23–24 (2005) (discussing the need for an enhanced sex offender registry program).
50
Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1395–96 (July 27, 2006).
51
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 315 (2d ed. 2006) (describing how presidential signing
statements issued when bills are signed into law have been increasingly designed to provide

288

MICHAEL R. HANDLER

[Vol. 101

Amendments’ lack of legislative history severely undermines the argument
that there is a compelling interest in carving out a special exception to the
BRA’s core principle of individualized judicially determined bail and
imposing mandatory pretrial release conditions for individuals charged with
sexual offenses.
Soon after the AWA Amendments were enacted, federal prosecutors
used them to try to impose stricter pretrial release conditions than the
judicial officer had determined was necessary after an individualized bail
hearing had been held pursuant to § 3142(f). For example, in United States
v. Arzberger, 52 the day after the judge issued the defendant’s pretrial release
order, the Government notified the court that certain additional conditions
were required under the AWA Amendments and asked the judge to modify
the terms of the defendant’s release accordingly. 53
Though the Government responded favorably to the AWA
Amendments and used them to try to impose harsher pretrial conditions, the
magistrates and district court judges, who were ultimately in charge of
setting pretrial release conditions, were generally less receptive. As Part III
describes, the district courts have, with few exceptions, refused to modify
their pretrial release order pursuant to AWA Amendments on the grounds
that they are unconstitutional.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS
The courts are split on whether the AWA Amendments to the BRA are
unconstitutional. There is only one published appellate court opinion on
this issue; 54 the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality has almost
exclusively been addressed by magistrate and district court judges.55 The
courts that have decided the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality have
done so in three different ways: (1) finding them facially unconstitutional,
(2) finding them unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, and (3)
finding them facially constitutional. The following is a brief review of
these three approaches.
guidance to administrative actors who will implement the laws and to influence the judicial
interpretation of the legislation).
52
592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
53
Id.
54
See United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the AWA
Amendments are facially constitutional). There is also one unpublished Ninth Circuit
decision, United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009). See infra notes
88–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kennedy.
55
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (2006), magistrates have original jurisdiction over all
matters pertaining to pretrial release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
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A. FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Many district courts faced with applying the AWA Amendments to
establish or modify pretrial release conditions for defendants charged with
sexual offenses against children have held that the Amendments are facially
unconstitutional. 56 This is especially powerful because a judicial finding
that a statute is facially unconstitutional renders it inoperative.57 In United
States v. Crowell, 58 a judge in the Western District of New York was one of
the first to hold that the AWA Amendments were facially
unconstitutional. 59 Crowell is also important because many district courts
that subsequently decided whether the AWA Amendments were facially
constitutional referenced the decision, adopting or rejecting its reasoning. 60
The court in Crowell evaluated challenges to the Amendments’
constitutionality based on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and separation of powers. 61 First, the court cited to
Salerno for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires that pretrial
release conditions or detention “not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived
evil to be avoided.” 62 The court held that although the additional conditions
sought to be imposed by the AWA Amendments were not per se violative
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail, the
imposition of such conditions regardless of a defendant’s personal
56
See United States v. Stephens, 699 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (holding that the
Amendments are facially unconstitutional under Due Process Clause), rev’d, 594 F.3d 1033
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (same);
United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Neb. 2009) (same); United States v. Merritt,
612 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Neb. 2009) (same); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (same); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(same); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901 (D.
Kan. Nov. 20, 2007) (holding that the Amendments are facially unconstitutional under the
Excessive Bail Clause, Due Process Clause, and separation of powers); United States v.
Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (same).
57
Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880
(2005). See also infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text for expanded discussion of the
requirements of making a facial challenge to the AWA Amendments.
58
United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006).
59
See United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (D. Mont. 2009) (describing
Crowell as “the first district court opinion to conclude the AWA amendments are
unconstitutional”); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(describing how Crowell was the first to consider the constitutionality of the AWA
Amendments).
60
See, e.g., Vujnovich, 2007 WL 4125901, at *2 (“[T]his Court, for the purpose of
brevity in this opinion, adopts and incorporates herein, in their entirety, the legal conclusions
reached by the Crowell court.”); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (“[T]his Court does not find Crowell dispositive to the case at bar.”).
61
Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *4.
62
Id. at *5 (citing to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754).
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characteristics, the circumstances of the offense, or consideration of factors
demonstrating that those same legitimate objectives can be achieved
through less onerous release conditions “will subject a defendant, for whom
such conditions are, in the court’s judgment, unnecessary, to excessive bail
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 63
Next, the court held that the AWA Amendments violate procedural
due process under the Fifth Amendment because mandating certain pretrial
release conditions and eliminating a defendant’s right to an independent
judicial determination directly restrict judicial discretion, the procedural
safeguard the Salerno Court cited as saving the BRA from violating
procedural due process. 64 The court in Crowell also held that the AWA
Amendments violate separation of powers because they “unambiguously
impose[] upon the federal judiciary a specific rule to be applied in
determining the release of a defendant charged with specified offenses,
thereby denying the court . . . its judicial authority to set such conditions.” 65
Many other courts have followed Crowell’s lead and similarly held
that the AWA Amendments are facially unconstitutional.66 In United States
v. Torres, 67 a judge from the Western District of Texas held that the AWA
Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions violated the Due
Process Clause because “procedural due process as set out by the United
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 68 and Salerno” demands
more than mandating that “every arrestee be treated the same,” stripped
away of any independent judicial evaluation.69 Unlike Crowell, however,
the court in Torres did not find that the AWA Amendments violated the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause on its face because “there are
circumstances when a court could reasonably find that the Adam Walsh
Amendments are valid under the Eighth Amendment.”70

63

Id. at *7.
Id. at *9 (citing to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751).
65
Id. at 11 (citing to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
66
See supra note 56.
67
566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
68
424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra note 122 and accompanying text for full discussion of
Mathews v. Eldridge and its procedural due process analysis.
69
Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
70
Id. at 600. Like in Torres, in United States v. Arzberger the district judge in the
Southern District of New York also held that the AWA Amendments facially violated the
Due Process Clause but did not facially violate the Excessive Bail Clause. See 592 F. Supp.
2d at 604; see also United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975–77 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(holding that the AWA Amendments were facially unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause but not resolving whether they were unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail Clause
or separation of powers grounds).
64
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B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

Some courts have declined to rule on whether the AWA Amendments
are facially unconstitutional, preferring to rule narrowly on an as-applied
basis. In United States v. Vujnovich, the magistrate judge granted the
defendant’s motion to remove the pretrial condition of electronic
monitoring imposed by the AWA Amendments, and “adopt[ed] and
incorporate[d] . . . the legal conclusions reached by the Crowell court” in
holding that the Amendment was unconstitutional. 71 On appeal, the district
judge declined to decide the AWA Amendments’ facial constitutionality
and instead held that the mandatory imposition of electronic monitoring
based solely on the crimes charged violated procedural due process as
applied to the defendant in the case.72
Similarly, a judge in the Western District of Washington in United
States v. Kennedy found that the AWA Amendments “under facts of this
case” were unconstitutional as a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause and
Due Process Clause. 73 In Kennedy, like most other cases where the
constitutionality of the Amendments was raised, the Government sought to
have the court modify the conditions of the defendant’s release.74 Although
the court adopted the reasoning of the court in Crowell, which held that the
AWA Amendments were facially unconstitutional, it instead found that the
AWA Amendments were unconstitutional “as applied to the Defendant.” 75
Moreover, the court did not even address the requirements of a facial
challenge. As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the
court’s decision. 76
In addition, in United States v. Polouizzi, United States District Judge
Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York found that AWA’s
requirement of electronic monitoring was “unconstitutional as applied in the
present case” because it “violates the constitutional prohibition on excessive
bail and guarantee of procedural due process as applied to this defendant at
the present time.” 77 Judge Weinstein declined to decide whether the Adam
71

No. 07-20126, 2007 WL 4125901, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007).
United State v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126, 2008 WL 687203, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11,
2008).
73
593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2008), rev’d, 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir.
2009).
74
Id. at 1223. In Kennedy, the Government sought to add the following conditions
pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act Amendments: (1) electronic monitoring; (2) restrictions on
place of abode; and (3) a specified curfew. Id.
75
Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).
76
See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v.
Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2009).
77
697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
72
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Walsh Act was facially constitutional, but suggested that it was because
“[t]here will be situations where certain sex offenders require that Adam
Walsh’s most stringent conditions be imposed.” 78
The Eighth Circuit, one of two appellate courts to address the
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments to the BRA, overturned a
decision from the Northern District of Iowa that held the AWA’s imposition
of mandatory pretrial release conditions unconstitutional because the
defendant could not “establish there are no child pornography defendants
for whom a curfew or electronic monitoring is appropriate.”79 Like the
other courts, the Eighth Circuit did not believe that Salerno’s “no
circumstances” for facial unconstitutionality was satisfied. 80
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

Only a few courts have found that the AWA Amendments are
constitutional as applied. In United States v. Gardner, a judge in the
Northern District of California upheld the constitutionality of the AWA
Amendments as applied to the defendant, rejecting his argument that the
Amendments violated the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process Clause,
and separation of powers. 81
First, the court held that imposing electronic monitoring pursuant to
the Amendments was not a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause as
applied to the defendant because the conditions legislatively imposed were
not excessive in relation to the government’s interest in “ensuring that
children have additional protection from sexual attacks and other violent
crimes” and “obtaining an additional safeguard against the risk of postarrest criminal activity.” 82 The court reasoned that electronic monitoring is
“slightly more intrusive” than the conditions the judicial officer found
necessary—curfew and travel restrictions.83 But, the court concluded
electronic monitoring did not “change the substantive restrictions on [the
defendant’s] liberty—she is to comply with the curfew irrespective of how
it is monitored.” 84

78

Id.; see also A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes On Child Pornography Law, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A1 (describing Judge Weinstein’s rulings in the Polouizzi case).
79
United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010), rev’g 699 F. Supp.
960 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
80
Id.
81
523 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
82
Id. at 1029, 1031 (internal quote omitted).
83
Id. at 1030.
84
Id. The court in Gardner also addressed and rejected the defendant’s argument that
the AWA Amendments violate the separation of powers, explaining that “[t]here is no final
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The court also addressed the defendant’s procedural due process
argument, admitting that while the lack of any opportunity to be heard on
the enumerated conditions imposed by the AWA Amendments raises a
closer question under the Due Process Clause than under the Excessive Bail
Clause, 85 a Due Process Clause challenge as applied to the current facts
could not be sustained. 86 The court reasoned that “even assuming arguendo
that some conditions of release would impair liberty interests cognizable
under the Fifth Amendment, here what is at issue is the singular condition
of electronic monitoring to enforce an already imposed curfew,” an
“incremental restriction” that alone does not implicate a protected liberty
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 87
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished memorandum decision
in United States v. Kennedy 88 held that the AWA Amendments were
constitutional because they could be construed as “requir[ing] the district
court to exercise its discretion, to the extent practicable, in applying the
mandatory release conditions.” 89 Thus, in applying the pretrial release
conditions mandatorily imposed by the AWA Amendments to individuals
charged with sexual offenses against children, the court “consider[ed] all
relevant factors, including the defendant’s job related needs,” and explained
how a lower court could set a procedure by “which defendant may travel by
air for work, with prior notice and approval.” 90 Similarly, in United States
v. Cossey, 91 a judge in the District of Montana upheld the AWA
Amendments’ constitutionality because they could be construed “as
allowing a judicial officer broad discretion to fashion conditions of pretrial
release on an individualized basis within the framework the AWA
amendments provide.” 92 Both the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy and the District
of Montana in Cossey justified their unique approach to applying the AWA
Amendments by citing to the principle of statutory construction that a

judgment in [the defendant’s] case” and that the “[b]ail process is not part of the adjudication
of the merits of the case but an ancillary proceeding.” Id. at 1035.
85
Id. at 1032 (“While the Court is troubled by automaticity of the Adam Walsh Act in
imposing certain release conditions without a judicial determination, the facts of the instant
case do not support [the defendant’s] procedural due process claim.”).
86
Id. at 1031.
87
Id. at 1032.
88
327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2009).
89
Id. at 707.
90
Id. at 708.
91
637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Mont. 2009).
92
Id. at 891.
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statute is to be construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid
raising doubts of its constitutionality. 93
The conflict among the courts regarding the AWA Amendments’
constitutionality underscores the pressing need for the issue to be resolved
either judicially by a Supreme Court decision or congressionally by repeal
or revision of the Amendments. Since there are no published circuit court
opinions on this issue, let alone a circuit split, Supreme Court review is
extremely unlikely any time soon. 94 Accordingly, Part IV argues that
Congress should repeal or revise the AWA Amendments to the BRA, and
Part V proposes revisions to the Amendments.
IV. CONGRESS MUST REPEAL OR REVISE THE ADAM WALSH ACT
AMENDMENTS TO THE BRA
First and foremost, the AWA Amendments are facially
unconstitutional as a violation of the Excessive Bail and Due Process
Clauses. 95 As discussed in Part III, many district courts have taken this
position. In addition to the AWA Amendments’ unconstitutionality, this
Comment also argues that the Amendments mandatory imposition of
pretrial release conditions on certain enumerated defendants is inconsistent
with the BRA’s well-established regulatory scheme of federal pretrial
release and detention, and yields little additional benefit to public safety at a
high cost to defendants.
A. THE ADAM WALSH AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT ARE
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

A threshold question in any case challenging the constitutionality of
legislation is whether the attack is directed to the validity of the statute on
its face or only as applied to the particular circumstances of the litigant
93

Id. at 888 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)); see also Kennedy,
327 F. App’x at 707 (“In light of the government’s concessions and in view of the
established principle that a statute should be read to avoid serious constitutional issues, we
construe the Walsh Act to require the district court to exercise its discretion, to the extent
practicable, in applying the mandatory release conditions.”).
94
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons,” which include “a United States court of appeals [entering] a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter.”).
95
This Comment agrees with Judge Francis’s opinion in Arzberger that the AWA
Amendments do not violate separation of powers because “the Supreme Court has already
determined that Congress may impinge on the traditionally judicial function of bail setting
by declaring that defendants who meet certain criteria will not be entitled to bail at all” and
“the role of the judiciary in setting bail conditions, while primary, is not exclusive.” United
States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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bringing the challenge. 96 If a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its
face, the state may not enforce it under any circumstances, unless an
appropriate court narrows its application.97 When a court holds a statute
unconstitutional as applied to particular facts, however, the state may
enforce the statute in circumstances involving different facts. 98
The Supreme Court generally disfavors facial challenges.99 In
Salerno, the Court explained that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is,
of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid.” 100 On the other hand, in Chicago v. Morales the
Court suggested that Salerno’s “test” was merely dicta and had never been a
decisive factor in any Supreme Court case.101 Other recent cases also
suggest that the Salerno rule is in retreat.102 Despite these developments, as
one commentator has pointed out, “Salerno still hangs on as official
doctrine” because “[a]s of yet, a majority of the Court has not repudiated or
explicitly limited Salerno” and “[l]ower courts continue to apply
Salerno.” 103 Accordingly, this Comment assumes Salerno controls a facial
challenge analysis.
1. The Adam Walsh Act Amendments are Facially Unconstitutional Under
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause
The imposition of mandatory pretrial release conditions is
unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail
Clause. The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” 104 Although the text of the Eighth
Amendment appears to address the amount of bail fixed (i.e. a monetary
constraint), courts agree that it controls pretrial release. 105 As noted by the
court in United States v. Gardner, “[i]f this most extreme condition—

96
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 236. (1994).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
101
527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999).
102
See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1336 n.16
(2005) (“The Salerno rule, of late, is in retreat. In a number of recent cases, the Court has
disregarded the Salerno rule and invalidated challenged statutes under a different, more
lenient rule, without as much as a nod towards Salerno.”).
103
See id.
104
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
105
United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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detention—is amenable to scrutiny under the Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, it would seem that conditions of release, particularly
those that approach confinement in function (e.g., home detention enforced
by electronic monitoring), should be subject to scrutiny as well.” 106
Moreover, in Salerno, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he only
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s
proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the
perceived evil,” a clear indication that the Excessive Bail Clause governs
pretrial release. 107
Salerno also suggests that the Excessive Bail Clause requires a judicial
officer to exercise his discretion in setting pretrial release conditions.108
The Court in Salerno explained that the Excessive Bail Clause requires that
“the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.” 109 According to the Court, “to
determine whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must
compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect
by means of that response.” 110 Thus, the Court concluded that “when the
Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail
must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no
more.” 111 Therefore, the BRA’s pretrial detention provision was not
facially excessive because it fell within a “carefully limited exception” of
“arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary
hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community
which no condition of release can dispel.” 112
Accordingly, under Salerno we must compare the government’s
general interest in protecting the public with its “response” to that interest—
the AWA Amendments’ mandatory imposition on the defendant accused
with sexual offenses against children of the following pretrial release
conditions: (1) refraining from contact with minors absent the direct
supervision of a responsible adult; (2) refraining from contact with the
alleged victims, witnesses, or family of the victims or witnesses;

106

Id.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 751–53; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding that “the fixing
of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of that defendant,” and that “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
109
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 (emphasis added).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 754 (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 5).
112
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
107
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(3) participating in a home confinement program and abiding by all
requirements of the program, including electronic monitoring or other
location verification system, the cost of which each defendant will be
required to pay, either in whole or in part; and (4) submitting to a curfew
restricting each defendant to his residence.113
Even assuming arguendo that the pretrial release conditions advance
the public’s valid interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and
exploitation, the Amendments still subject a defendant to excessive bail in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Imposition of the AWA Amendments’
mandatory pretrial release conditions on all defendants charged with certain
crimes, regardless of personal characteristics, circumstances of the offense,
or consideration of factors demonstrating that those same legitimate
objectives cannot be achieved with less onerous release conditions, will
inevitably subject a defendant to pretrial release conditions that are
excessive. 114
Moreover, Congress did not articulate any interest in making these
pretrial conditions mandatory. As discussed above, the AWA Amendments
to the BRA were added to the language of the AWA only seven days prior
to the bill’s final passage, without substantive debate or supporting
congressional reports. 115 Unlike the AWA’s other provisions,116 there are
no legislative findings explaining Congress’s interest in having mandatory
pretrial release conditions.117 In fact, some of the courts that have rejected
the Excessive Bail Clause argument for holding the AWA Amendments
unconstitutional have found that the general interest of “protecting the
safety of children” is sufficient to justify the AWA Amendments’ pretrial
release conditions, but have not separately considered whether the interest
justifies the fact that they are mandatorily imposed. 118 Whereas the AWA
Amendments’ general interest in protecting children from sex offenders

113
114

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006).
United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,

2006).
115
See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (debate following passage of
Sen. Hatch’s amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the mandatory
conditions).
116
See supra note 48.
117
Id.
118
See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“[The
defendant] is correct insofar as he points out that Congress did not engage in substantive
debate nor develop supporting congressional reports with regard to the Adam Walsh
Amendments at issue here. However, there are legislative findings pertaining to the Adam
Walsh Act itself. The Act states that the Government’s interest in the legislation is to
provide additional protection to children ‘from sexual attacks and other violent crimes.’”)
(citation omitted).
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might suffice if the conditions were based on individual circumstances, it is
insufficient in light of the much greater burden mandatory pretrial release
conditions impose on defendants.
Some have argued that the AWA Amendments cannot be facially
unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail Clause because they fail to meet
Salerno’s “no circumstances” standard for facially unconstitutional
legislation, 119 since there are in fact some circumstances when a court
would determine that these conditions of release are not excessive in light
of the perceived evil an individual poses based on his individual
circumstances and characteristics.120 Yet, even if the “some circumstances”
requirement for a facial challenge forces courts to rule on the AWA
Amendments’ constitutionality on an “as applied” basis, this will essentially
render the mandatory requirement moot anyway. The AWA Amendments
will be toothless when a judge determines after an individualized hearing
that the mandatory conditions imposed on the defendant are excessive and,
therefore, unconstitutional as applied.
2. The Adam Walsh Act Amendments are Facially Invalid Under the Due
Process Clause
The AWA Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 are also
facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process under the
Fifth Amendment, which provides that “No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”121 Under Mathews v.
Eldridge, procedural due process requires consideration of three distinct
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the
function involved, and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.122
Each of the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions
infringe upon a significant private interest. Electronic monitoring,
119
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”). See also supra notes 96–103
and accompanying text for discussion on facial challenge requirements.
120
See, e.g., United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(rejecting Excessive Bail Clause facial challenge to the AWA Amendments because there
are circumstances when a court could reasonably find the Amendments valid); Torres, 566
F. Supp. 2d at 600 (same).
121
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
122
424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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mandatory curfew, and restrictions on personal associations, place of abode,
or travel deprive an individual of his right of “freedom of movement among
locations” and the right “to remain in a public place,” which are
fundamental to our sense of personal liberty “protected by the
Constitution.” 123
The AWA Amendments’ mandatory condition that a defendant
charged with one or more of the enumerated offenses avoid all contact with
a potential witness who may testify implicates the First Amendment right of
association. The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
declared that “one of the foundations of our society is the right of
individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by
lawful means.” 124 The Supreme Court has held that to be cognizable, the
interference with associational rights must be “direct and substantial” or
“significant.” 125 The AWA Amendments surely meet this requirement, as a
person accused of certain crimes is categorically prohibited from any
contact with a class of individuals.126
Also, the AWA Amendments’ mandatory requirement that an
individual refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other
dangerous weapon infringes on an individual’s Second Amendment right to
bear arms as established in District of Columbia v. Heller. 127 Although the
Court in Heller indicated that this privilege may be withdrawn from some
groups of persons such as convicted felons, there is no basis for
categorically depriving persons who are merely accused of certain crimes of
the right to legal possession of a firearm. 128
The AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions pose a
high risk of erroneously depriving individuals of their private interests129
because there is no individualized judicial determination of whether their
imposition is necessary to ensure the public’s safety based upon the
arrestee’s particular circumstances. 130 Consequently, “there is no means of
123

Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982).
125
Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366, 367 & n.5 (1988) (citation omitted).
126
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
127
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
128
Id. at 2816–17.
129
See Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 603–04 (“[T]here is no indication of what the
overall ‘error rate’ might be with respect to defendants generally, that is, how many
defendants upon whom the Amendments automatically impose a curfew would be relieved
of that condition if their specific circumstances were considered. But especially in the
absence of any findings by Congress as to the efficacy of a curfew requirement, it cannot be
assumed that courts would generally require a curfew for defendants charged with child
pornography offenses if such a condition were discretionary rather than mandatory.”).
130
United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
124
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knowing whether the deprivation is erroneous or warranted.” 131 Imposing
certain pretrial conditions based merely on an arrestee’s status as one
allegedly involved in a certain crime will lead to situations where the
defendant is burdened with conditions that a judge would have found
unnecessary and inappropriate. 132
Procedural safeguards in imposing the AWA Amendments’ pretrial
release conditions would alleviate the risk of erroneous deprivation because
a judicial officer would be able to ensure that conditions are appropriate in
light of the arrestee’s individual circumstances. In fact, the Supreme Court
in Salerno found that the BRA’s procedural safeguards under § 3142(f), 133
including judicial evaluation of an individual’s circumstances at a hearing,
“further[ed] the accuracy” of the determination of defendant’s future
dangerousness, and, ultimately, whether pretrial detention or conditional
pretrial release was appropriate.134 Likewise, limiting the imposition of the
AWA Amendments’ pretrial conditions to situations where they are found
to be appropriate after a § 3142(f) hearing would similarly “further the
accuracy” of the defendant’s pretrial release order.
Lastly, affording a defendant the procedural protections provided to
him under the BRA—namely, the opportunity to present evidence at a bail
hearing as to his individual characteristics and the particular circumstances
of his offense—would not impede or burden the government’s interest in
applying the pretrial conditions prescribed by the AWA Amendments. 135
For one, the Amendments’ pretrial conditions could still be imposed, but
only when a judicial officer deems them appropriate. Also, the additional
procedural protections would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation at
little cost; proceedings are already conducted to determine whether a
defendant should be detained or released on bail, the amount of bail, and the
need for conditions of release other than those required by the AWA
Amendments. 136 Accordingly, the additional burden of requiring a judicial
officer to make an individualized determination as to whether the AWA
Amendments’ now mandatory pretrial conditions are necessary to ensure
the public’s safety would be minimal.
The Court’s discussion of procedural due process in Salerno further
supports the AWA Amendments’ facial unconstitutionality. Unlike the
131

Id.
Id.
133
Section 3142(f) also provides a defendant with the right to counsel, the ability to
testify on one’s own behalf, the ability to present information by proffer or otherwise, and
the right to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing.
134
481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
135
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006).
136
§ 3142(f).
132
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facial test for the Excessive Bail Clause, which looks at the substantive
consequence of the Amendments, whether bail will be excessive in light of
the perceived evil, 137 in Salerno the Court explained it would sustain a
facial challenge to BRA’s detention provision if the procedures were
“adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons]
charged with crimes whether or not they may be insufficient in some
particular circumstances.” 138 The Court held that the BRA’s “extensive
safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge” because the procedures by
which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are
specifically designed to further the accuracy of the future dangerousness
determination. 139
There are absolutely no procedural safeguards when applying the
AWA Amendments’ pretrial release conditions to individuals charged with
the applicable offenses. In fact, the raison d’ être of mandatory pretrial
release conditions is to ensure that they are imposed when a judge would
otherwise think they are unnecessary based on the individual defendant’s
circumstances. Some might argue that the Court’s procedural due process
analysis in Salerno does not control the AWA Amendments because the
pretrial release conditions at issue are inapposite to detention without bail.
While it is true that a defendant has significantly more at stake in the
context of detention than conditions limiting an individual’s pretrial release
liberty, there is no hierarchy of constitutional rights.140
Some might also argue that the Amendments are not facially violative
of the Due Process Clause because there will be some situations where the
imposition of the mandatory pretrial release conditions would not be
unconstitutional. 141 Yet, while this argument has some merit in the context
of the Excessive Bail Clause, it fails in the context of due process because
Mathews v. Eldridge requires that the procedures themselves be adequate.

137
See supra notes 104–120 and accompanying text for discussion of facial challenge to
Excessive Bail Clause.
138
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 264 (1984)).
139
Id. at 752.
140
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (“The very
enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon.”).
141
See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(arguing that the imposition of electronic monitoring does not violate procedural due process
in part because it “represents only a minor change in [the defendant’s] current regimen of
release conditions”).
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3. Is There an Alternative Construction of the Adam Walsh Act Amendments
to Avoid Constitutional Doubt?
Under the constitutional avoidance doctrine of statutory interpretation,
judges construe a statute to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality. 142
Conceding that the dictates of the Due Process and Excessive Bail Clauses
require an individualized assessment in determining appropriate pretrial
release conditions, some courts contend that the AWA Amendments can be
interpreted consistently with this requirement so long as judicial officers
apply the mandatory pretrial release conditions based on their
individualized determination of all relevant factors, including job-related
For example, all defendants charged under the AWA
needs. 143
Amendments are subject to a curfew, but one defendant may have a later
curfew than another because he gets off of work at a later time. 144
While it is true that the AWA Amendments “confer[] upon the [district
judge] a great deal of discretion with respect to the implementation of the
[release] conditions that are required by the [AWA Amendments],” 145 the
dictates of procedural due process as set out in Mathews v. Eldridge require
individualized determination of appropriate conditions, not just the scope of
the condition. Even assuming that a judge frames the conditions in a
manner most favorable to the defendant, their imposition still impedes his
significant interest in liberty. This argument is bolstered by the fact that
neither of the two decisions to take the “constitutional avoidance” approach
described in Parts III and IV 146—Cossey and Kennedy—applied the
Mathews procedural due process test. 147

142

See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 50, at 361; see also Ashwanter v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an act of
the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
143
See cases cited supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
144
See, e.g., United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 890–91 (D. Mont. 2009)
(describing how AWA Amendments were not imposed as a “blanket prescription” because
the magistrate “fashion[ed] an appropriate condition of electronic monitoring that would
enable [the defendant] to continue his employment”).
145
United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009).
146
See supra notes 88-93 and Part IV.A.3.
147
See United States v. Stephens, No. 09-3037, 2009 WL 3823964, at *9 n.2 (N.D. Iowa
2009) (holding that the AWA Amendments constituted facial violation of due process and
rejecting the reasoning and decision in United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.
Mont. 2009) and United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009) because
“neither contain any Mathews analysis”).
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B. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE BRA’S INDIVIDUALIZED BAIL FRAMEWORK

Although the AWA Amendments’ unconstitutionality is as good of a
reason as any for their repeal or revision, and the district courts have
primarily justified their refusal to apply the Amendments’ mandatory
imposition of pretrial release conditions on constitutional grounds, there is
also a normative legal justification. The AWA Amendments’ imposition of
mandatory pretrial release conditions is inconsistent with the central
principle of the BRA’s regulatory scheme—individualized bail based on a
judicial determination.
When Congress enacted the BRA, one of its goals was to “provid[e]
for flexibility in setting conditions of release appropriate to the
characteristics of individual defendants.” 148 Congress further observed that
[m]any of the changes in the bail reform act [of 1984] . . . reflect the committee’s
determination that federal bail law must address the alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release and must give the courts adequate authority to make
release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to
149
others if released.

One possible argument is that the whole act rule of statutory
interpretation mandates that judges interpret the Amendments so that they
are consistent with the BRA’s procedural scheme of individualized bail
based on judicial hearing. Under the whole act rule, a statute is interpreted
with the presumption in mind that “Congress uses terms consistently,
intends that each provision add something to the statutory scheme, and does
not want one provision to be applied in ways that undercut other
provisions.” 150
Here, however, there is no ambiguity in the text of the AWA
Amendments from which one can reasonably construe them so that,
consistent with the BRA’s regulatory scheme, the conditions of pretrial
release are decided by a judicial officer based on individual
characteristics.151 All courts that have issued reported decisions addressing
148

S. REP. NO. 225-98, at 26 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3187–88
(1984).
149
Id.
150
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 271.
151
The whole act rule is a canon of statutory construction that is used to interpret
ambiguous statutes. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (describing statutory construction as a “holistic endeavor”
and noting that “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a
context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law”) (citation omitted).
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the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality agree with the court in Crowell
that “[t]he plain language of the Adam Walsh Amendments establishes that
Congress has attempted to mandate the imposition by the court of certain
pretrial release conditions for those defendants charged with certain
crimes.” 152 Thus, considering that congressional intent is clear based on the
text of the AWA Amendments, anything but interpreting the statute to
mandate that the court impose the pretrial release conditions prescribed by
the Amendments would be the equivalent of the judiciary rewriting the
statute.
Instead of judicial application of the whole act rule, Congress should
aspire to the doctrine’s normative goal of a consistent statutory scheme
because “[a] polity whose law knits together into a seamless fabric is one
whose law enjoys greater authority than a polity whose statutory law
appears largely random.” 153 As Ronald Dworkin explains in Law’s Empire,
“[i]nternally compromised statutes cannot be seen as flowing from any
single coherent scheme of principle; on the contrary, they serve the
incompatible aim of a rulebook community, which is to compromise
convictions along lines of power.” 154 Therefore, Congress should revise the
Amendments so that, consistent with the rest of the BRA’s principled
approach to bail, the prescribed pretrial conditions are imposed only if
found appropriate to the individual’s circumstances after a judicial hearing.
C. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY
HIGH COSTS AND LOW BENEFITS

The AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions are not
only unconstitutional and inconsistent with the BRA’s regulatory scheme of
judicially determined bail, but also come at a great cost to defendants while
yielding marginal additional safety to the public. Since there were no
legislative findings behind Congress’s adding and passing the Amendments
to the BRA as part of the Adam Walsh Act, we can only speculate as to
why Congress thought mandatory pretrial release conditions were
necessary. 155
It is clear that electronic monitoring and the other conditions in the
BRA that are made mandatory by the Amendments are intended to protect
the public from the defendant. Yet, as courts have pointed out,
“[p]roceedings are already conducted to determine whether a defendant
152

United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,

2006).
153
154
155

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 214 (1986).
Id.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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should be detained or released on bail, the amount of bail, and the need for
conditions of release other than those required by the Amendment . . . .” 156
Thus, by making the pretrial release conditions mandatory, Congress is in
effect second-guessing the judicial officer’s judgment. Separation of
powers aside, this is troubling because Congress is doing so via a blanket
rule that bases pretrial release conditions exclusively on the offense the
defendant is charged with and, unlike the rest of the BRA’s regulatory bail
scheme, does not take into consideration the individual’s circumstances.
Even assuming that Congress is justifiably concerned that judicial
officers apply overly lenient pretrial release conditions, there are other
procedural prophylactic measures in place to ensure pretrial release
conditions are appropriate. For example, either party may directly appeal a
trial court’s release order.157 Considering that district court judges usually
decide bail on appeal after a magistrate judge has issued a pretrial release
order, a prosecutor fearful that pretrial release conditions are not strict
enough has two opportunities to appeal. 158
A blanket rule imposing pretrial release conditions on defendants
without regard to their individual characteristics and circumstances, and the
inevitable unnecessary constraints placed on defendants that naturally
follow from such a rule, is especially offensive when one considers how
costly implementing these conditions is to the defendants themselves and to
the government. As discussed above, all of the AWA Amendments’
prescribed pretrial release conditions infringe on a significant individual
private interest. 159 Furthermore, the defendant does not always bear the
cost of following the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release
conditions by himself.
For example, the defendant must pay for electronic monitoring out of
his own pocket unless he cannot afford it. 160 At around thirty dollars per
week, 161 the cost of electronic monitoring can accumulate quickly,
considering that many defendants wait months or even years for a trial.
Usually, someone in addition to the defendant, such as a spouse, children,

156
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
157
See Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 121, 144 (2009) (“Appeal from pretrial detention is available, although the
standard of review varies widely among the circuit courts of appeal.”).
158
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006).
159
See supra Part IV.A.2.
160
Telephone Interview with Anne Marie Carey, Chief of Pretrial Servs., N. Dist. of Ill.
(Mar. 12, 2010).
161
Id.
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or parents, will help pay for electronic monitoring. 162 When the defendant
is indigent, taxpayers foot the bill for electronic monitoring. 163 Although it
might be a cost they would be happy to pay for if it provides additional
safety to children, indiscriminately applying costly conditions based on the
arrestee’s charge rather than individual circumstances will likely lead to
situations where they pay for electronic monitoring with no net safety
benefit.
V. A PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS
This Comment has criticized the AWA Amendments as (1)
unconstitutional, (2) inconsistent with the core principle of the BRA
regulatory scheme, and (3) characterized by high costs and low benefits. In
light of these problems, Congress must take swift action to fix the flaws in
the AWA Amendments. Obviously, it could repeal the Amendments.
However, Congress will likely disfavor such a steep measure, as there is no
sign that the “passion” which served as impetus for the AWA and the AWA
Amendments has subsided since 2006. 164
As an alternative, Congress could replace the Amendments’ mandatory
language with a “rebuttable presumption” 165 that the now mandatory
pretrial release conditions will be applied unless a defendant can offer
The rebuttable
contrary evidence that they are not necessary. 166
presumption provision is the best of both worlds. On one hand, it furthers
the AWA Amendments’ purpose of protecting minors from alleged sex
offenders. By shifting the burden of production from the Government to
the defendant during the BRA’s adversary hearing, public safety is still
maximized because only defendants that can convincingly show a judge
that the Amendments’ pretrial release conditions are unnecessary will be
free from their imposition. The rebuttable presumption is also consistent
with the adversary hearing provided by the BRA, as a defendant will have a
chance to show a judge why the AWA Amendments’ pretrial release
conditions are not necessary for his situation.

162

Id.
Id.
164
See Spencer Magloff, Obama Talks Law Enforcement on “America’s Most Wanted,”
POLITICAL
HOTSHEET—CBS
NEWS.COM
(March
4,
2010,
06:26
EST),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6267165-503544.html (describing how the
President during his March 2010 appearance on the television show America’s Most Wanted
pledged to fully support the Adam Walsh Act).
165
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (8th ed. 2004). A “rebuttable presumption” is “[a]n
inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case which may be overcome
by the introduction of contrary evidence.” Id.
166
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) (2006).
163

2011]

A CALL TO REPEAL THE ADAM WALSH ACT

307

Furthermore, there is already a similar provision in the BRA under
§ 3142(e), in which a rebuttable presumption arises that a defendant should
be detained if he has been convicted of certain offenses. 167 This provision
was included in the original version of the BRA enacted in 1984, which was
upheld as constitutional in Salerno.168 In short, revising the Amendments
so that a judge has some discretion and a defendant has an opportunity to
explain why these pretrial release conditions are not necessary to ensure
public safety protects the defendant’s constitutional rights while ensuring
that the government is able to regulate bail in a manner that maximizes
public safety.
While the rebuttable presumption change would resolve the Due
Process and Excessive Bail Clauses’ constitutional problems that arise due
to the Amendments’ automaticity, some commentators have suggested that
the BRA’s rebuttable presumption provision is itself unconstitutional as a
violation of due process. 169 Even if there is a strong argument in theory
against the constitutionality of the BRA’s rebuttable presumption provision,
practically speaking it is unlikely that after more than twenty-five years any
appellate court, let alone the Supreme Court, would address this issue. In
fact, although the Court in Salerno did not address the constitutionality of
the BRA’s rebuttable presumption, in holding that the BRA was
Changing the AWA
constitutional they implicitly approved it.170

167

Id. The section reads:

(A) the person has been convicted of a Federal offense that is described in subsection (f)(1) of
this section, or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in
subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed;
(B) the offense described in subparagraph (A) was committed while the person was on release
pending trial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and
(C) a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction, or the release of
the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in subparagraph (A), whichever is later.
168

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Susan M. Marcella, When Preventive Detention is (Still) Unconstitutional:
The Invalidity of the Presumption in the 1984 Federal Bail Statute, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091
(1988) (arguing that the BRA’s presumption of dangerousness violates a defendant’s
constitutional rights to pretrial liberty); Robert S. Natalini, Preventive Detention and
Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225
(1985) (arguing that preventive detention resulting from a process in which the accused is
presumed to be dangerous and bears the burden of rebutting that presumption is a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law).
170
The Court in Salerno explicitly upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the
provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully
limited exception.”). Thus, even though the rebuttable presumption provision was not
169
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Amendments from being mandatorily imposed to being imposed with a
rebuttable presumption would fix the Amendments’ unconstitutionality and
costliness, as well as their inconsistency with the rest of the BRA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must take action and repeal or revise the AWA
Amendments. Imposing mandatory pretrial release conditions on all
defendants charged with sexual offenses against children is not only
unconstitutional, as many courts have found, 171 but also inconsistent with
the entire regulatory scheme of bail set forth in the BRA, and very costly.
Rather than automatic imposition of pretrial release conditions, Congress
should change the language of the AWA Amendments so that, consistent
with § 3142(e), the defendant can avoid imposition of the AWA
Amendments’ now mandatory pretrial release conditions if he can
demonstrate they do not need to be applied to him to ensure the public’s
safety. This is not only consistent with the BRA, but clearly constitutional
and, most importantly, consistent with Congress’ original intent in enacting
the AWA Amendments—protecting the public from sexual predators.

explicitly mentioned as constitutional, the principle of the “greater includes the lesser”
suggests it was implicitly upheld as such.
171
See cases cited supra note 56.

